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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

13 September 1960

	To population 2000	
	DAILY BRIEF	25X1
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	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	
	<u> </u>	
	II. ASIA-AFRICA	
25X1	Tunisia-Algeria: President Bourguiba, whose restrictions on Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia have hampered rebel operations in Algeria, appears to be adopt-	oK
	ing a more permissive attitude toward the FLN. His recent pub-	=
	lic speeches indicate a change in attitude, and he reportedly now has agreed to permit "volunteers" for the Algerian fighting, in-	* *
	cluding any that might be sent from Communist China, to transit	,
	Tunisia. Bourguiba presumably is motivated by a number of factors, including disillusion with De Gaulle's Algerian policy, con	- , -
	cern that the FLN might sabotage the newly opened oil pipeline	
	from Saharan Algeria to the Tunisian coast, and even fear of an FLN-engineered assassination attempt. (Page 3)	25X1
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Tunisian President Gives Firmer Support to Algerian Rebels

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Bourguiba continues to be deeply concerned over the disruptive effects of the Algerian rebellion on North Africa in general and on Tunisia in particular. He is also faced with the immediate security problem engendered by the presence of an estimated 10,000 rebel troops within his country's borders. As a result, although he has publicly championed the rebel cause, he has sharply restricted the movement of troops and supplies within Tunisia. At the same time, he has attempted to act as a mediator between France and the FLN. His apparent shift toward closer identification with the FLN probably is motivated partly by disappointment with De Gaulle's Algerian policy and partly by concern that the FLN might sabotage the new oil pipeline from Saharan Algeria to the Tunisian coast. In addition, Bourguiba reportedly believes that the restrictions he has imposed on the FLN have made him an assassination target for the rebels, and he may be attempting to placate the Algerian leaders.

Bourguiba is also assisting in the rebel campaign to bring the Algerian dispute into international forums. He stated on 3 September that the Tunisians are ready "to join our fate with that of Algeria if this union would hasten the end of the war."

have recently announced that their government and the provisional Algerian government are studying ways

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, ,,	Approved For Release 2002/ <mark>06/05 : CIA-RD</mark> P79T00975A005300110001-0	25X1
25X1	to achieve "an eventual organic and political fusion of Tunisia and Algeria." Such a move presumably would be designed to give the rebel government a certain amount of official standing during the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.	
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